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a inore diversified structure \Vithin the corporations. The 
United States Steel Company, from 1986 the USX Corpora-
tion, is no\v involved in the oil and gas industry as \veH as 
the chen1ical industt)'. 
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GORAN RYDEN 
MEXICO. The econo1nic histo1y of post-conquest Mexi-
co can be divided, son1e\vhat arbitrarily, into six distinct 
periods. In the first, fTon1 the Spanish Conquest in 1519 to 
1630, the indigenous population declined by inore than 90 
percent but productivity increased. In the second period, 
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from 1630 to 1810, per capita output probably fluctuated 
around a level comparable to that of the thirteen British 
North American colonies in the early eighteenth centUl)'. 
Ups\vings occu1Ted due to occasional bursts of activity as-
sociated \Vith short-lived bonanzas in the colony's main ex-
port indust1y, silver n1ining; but the long-ter1n trend \Vas 
flat. The third period began \Vith the outbreak of the inde~ 
pendence wars (1810-1821), which provoked a sharp de-
cline in per capita income led by the collapse of silver n1in-
ing and external trade, fron1 \vhich the econon1y did not 
fully recover until after 1880. Elite political strife, peasant 
rebellions, and foreign invasions interrupted each short-
lived ups\ving until a milita1y coup brought Porfirio Diaz 
to po\vcr in 1877. 
The fourth era in Mexican economic histo1y, conven-
tionally called the "Porfiriato" after President Diaz, coin-
cided \Vith the onset of sustained econon1ic gro\vth f:ro1n 
the 1870s until the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 
1911. In this era, political stability and institutional re~ 
form, co1nbined \Vith the development of an extensive rail-
road net\vork and foreign direct investment, led to rapid, 
export-led econo1nic gro\vth. The fifth period extends 
from 1911 until 1982. The economy had just managed to 
recover from the Revolution (1911-1917) in the 1920s, 
\vhen the Great Depression provoked a shift to\vard state~ 
led import-substitution industrialization (ISI) that came 
to be vie\ved as part of the Revolution's legitiinating lega-
cy. This strategy produced high rates of econon1ic gro\vth 
fron1 the 1930s until the financial and econo1nic crisis of 
1982. 
The sixth and final era began \Vith the 1982 crisis and the 
decisive shift in 1985-1986 to a market-oriented econo1nic 
strategy that culn1inated \Vith the signing of the North 
An1erican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) \Vith Canada 
and the United States. This treaty\vent into effect on 1 Jan-
uat)' 1994. Despite its pron1ise, rates of econon1ic gro\vth 
achieved in this era averaged \Vell belo\v those of the Por-
firiato and ISI periods. 
The Conquest Era, 1521-1630. The Aztec (also called 
Mexica) capital city of Tenochtitlan fell to an invading 
ar1ny of Spanish adventurers and indigenous allies led by 
Hernan Cortes on 13 August 1521. The Spaniards called 
their ne\v colony Nueva Espafia (Ne\v Spain). Spanish rule 
lasted until Mexico became independent in 1821. 
Rapid and profound den1ographic and econon1ic chan-
ges follo,ved the Conquest. A pre-Colutnbian population 
estiinated variously at bet\veen 10 and 30 n1illion fell to 
barely 1.1111illion by 1605 as a result of introduction of Eu-
ropean diseases for \vhich the native population had 
no natural in1nn1nities. Abuse, forced Jabot~ 1nalnutrition, 
and social disruption contributed to the high rnortality 
rates in the virgin soil epiden1ics that took four to five 






at rates of less than 1 percent in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries raised the total population of the 
colony to nearly 6 million in 1810 (see Table 1). 
The Spanish conquerors introduced European plants, 
animals, technology, and economic organization. The in-
digenous side of this "Colombian Exchange" included 
corn (maize) and beans (frijoles), staples of the indigenous 
diet, as \ve11 as cacao (for chocolate), cochineal (red dye) 
and indigo (blue dye), tomatoes, peanuts, pumpkins, and 
many varieties of hot peppers (chiles). The Europeans 
brought \Vheat and other grains, bananas, sugar cane, mel-
ons, onions, grapes, and orchard crops as \vell as a variety 
of don1esticated ungulates (hoofed aniinals), including 
sheep, cattle, horses, donkeys, pigs, and goats. Initially, 
these animals contributed to undern1ining the indigenous 
econo1ny as ungulate irruptions in several areas devastat-
ed native agriculture. Ho\vever, many indigenous commu-
nities eventually acquired animals for production and 
transportation as \vell as for food. 
TABLE 1. Population and Per Capita GDP of Mexico, 1519-1999 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the ren1aining in-
digenous population probably had a more productive agri-
culture and a 1nore varied diet than before the Conquest. 
As the population fell, those \vho survived abandoned mar-
ginal lands or converted them to pasture. Land grants to 
Spanish in1migrants led to the creation of private hacien-
das and ranchos and accelerated the introduction of ne\v 
plants and animals as \Vell as iron tools and implen1ents. 
The chief value of Ne\v Spain to the mother country, 
ho\veve1~ caine fTom silver production. The indigenous 
population produced small quantities of precious metals 
from surface and placer mines. In the 1530s, the Spaniards 
introduced deep-shaft silver mining at Sultepec and 
Zun1pango near Mexico City and at Taxco to the south. The 
nlajor strikes, ho\veve1~ occurred in the north at Zacatecas 
(1546) and Guanajuato (1550). The mines used a mixed la-
bor force of indigenous forced laborers, fTee \vage\vorkers, 
and (later in the century) African slaves. Productivity in-
creased \Vith the introduction in the mid-lSSOs of the 
PER CAPITA GDP TOTAL PERCENT 
PoPULATfON GRO\VTH RATE (INTERNATIONAL GRO\\'TH RATE OF CHANGE IN PER CAPITA 
YEAR (MILLIONS) OF POPULATION DOLLARS OF 1990) PER CAPITA GDP GDP BETIVEEN DATES 
1519 10 to 30 500-600 
1605 1.1 (2.0) to (3.1) 755 0.2-0.4 20-34 
1700 2.6 0.9 755 0 0 
1800 6.0 0.8 755 0 0 
1820 6.2 0.3 566 -1.4 -25 
1845 7.5 0.9 592 0.2 5 
1860 8.0 0.4 535 -0.7 10 
1867 8.5 0.7 535 0 0 
1877 9.7 1.3 642 1.9 17 
1900 13.6 1.5 1,157 2.6 80 
1910 15.2 1.1 1,435 2.2 19 
1940 19.7 0.9 1,556 0.3 8 
1980 69.7 3.2 5,254 3.1 238 
1992 89.6 2.2 5,112 -0.2 -3 
1999 95.8 0.9 5,817 1.6 14 
(1) Population based on INEGI (1985). 
(2) The estimate of GDP per capita 1519 is pure speculation; it assu1nes that 400 1990 international dollars \Vould represent a bare subsistence. 
(3) 1630 and 1700 GDP per capita esthnates are set equal to 1800 to embody the a'ssu1nption that per capita GDP did not change nnich in the colo-
nial era. (See CoatS\Vorth, 1988.) 
(4) The 1800, 1845, 1860, and 1877 GDP per capita figures are based on CoatS\\'Orth (1978, 1989). They are conve1ied to 1990 international dol-
lars following l\1addison (1994, 1995). l\·laddison's 1994 estimates extrapolated INEGI (1985) figures to construct estimates for 1820, 1850, 
1870, and 1877. Ho\veve1~ the INEGI figures are n1erely Coastsworth's 1978 estin1ates, \Vhich he first published in 1970 dollars, conve1ied by 
INEGI to pesos of 1970 at the 1970 exchange rate of 26.5 pesos to the dolla1: To cove1i INEGI's GDP figures fron11970 pesos to 1990 interna-
tional dollars, l\1addison divided then1 by 2.5. His estilnates are thus those of Coatswotihnntltiplied by 26.5 and then divided by 2.5; this is the 
same as Coats\VOrth's figures 1nultiplied by 10.6. I have prefen·ed to use Coatsworth's 1989 estimates of !>Aexican GDP in pesos of 1900. These 
figures arc converted to 1990 international dollars using the ratio of 1910 GDP per capita estimates by Coats\vo1ih in 1900 pesos to l\1addison 
in 1990 international dollars (13.6). 
(5) For 1820 GDP per capita, I set aside Maddison's extrapolation in favor of a figure that reflects the substantial decline in econon1ic activity 
known to have occur-red during the independence \Vars between 1810 and 1820. The figure in the table assu1nes that per capita inco1ne fell by 
one-fou1ih, probably an upper lin1it, though contemporary estln1ates nin up to one-third. 
(6) The 1900, 1910, 1940, 1980, and 1992 GDP per capita estin1ates are f-ro111 Maddison (1995). 






"a1nalgamation" process, \Vhich used small amounts of 
mercury to refine ore too poor in silver content to be re-
fined by traditional sn1elting. The Spanish cro\vn retained 
o\vnership of all subsoil mineral resources and levied a tax 
of 20 percent on gross output, the royal "fifth," later drop-
ped under certain conditions to a royal "tenth." 
To subordinate and exploit the indigenous population, 
the Spaniards experin1ented \Vith a variety of institutional 
arrangements. The Spanish La\V of the Indies assigned 
differing rights, privileges, obligations, and taxes to the 
colony's diverse ethnic strata or "castes." Indigenous vil-
lages received communal lands in mortmain, \Vhich made 
alienation and sale illegal and thus restrained, but did not 
e1in1inate, usurpation and theft. Indians could not bear 
arms, ride horses, dress like Europeans, n1ove from their 
villages \VithOut permission, or aspire to certain occupa-
tions and offices. Indians \Vere usually exempt from sales 
and excise taxes, but paid a tributo (head tax) not levied on 
others. Africans, mestizos (people of mixed European and 
indigenous ancestry), and others of nlixed ancestry re-
ceived a mixture of p1ivileges and exclusions. Europeans 
stood at the top of the hierarchy. 
Initially, the cro\vn issued grants of enco111ienda to lead-
ing conquerors, "entrusting" them \Vith responsibility for 
conversion and control of indigenous peoples in specified 
villages and areas. E11co111enderos demanded personal 
service and collected tribute pay1nents in kind or labo1; us-
ing native lords as go-bet\veens. Faced \vith high mo1ia1ity 
rates, sin1i1ar to those that ha~ virtually \Viped out the en-
tire indigenous population of the Caribbean by 1520, the 
cro\vn formally abolished Indian slavery and personal 
service \Vith the '1Ne\v La\vs," issued in 1542, but simulta-
neously encouraged the use of African slaves. The same 
legislation sought to abolish the encon1ienda, but this pro-
vision \Vas temporarily \Vithdra\VIl. The cro\vn had already 
bCgun creating royal e11con1ie1ulas, assigning indigenous 
villages to direct supe1vision by royal officials. By the 
1570s, 1nost private enco111iendas had been abolished or 
abandoned in central Mexico, \Vhere population decline 
had n1ade them far less valuable than before. After experi-
n1enting \vith government-managed labor drafts called 
reparti11zientos de indios for Spanish e1nployers, the syste1n 
\Vas abandoned in stages bet\veen 1599 and 1630 in favor 
of a free-laborn1arket distorted by caste distinctions. 
Colonial Stagnation, 1630-1821. The slow recovery of 
the illdigenous population after about 1630 coincided \Vith 
a period of stagnation in governn1ent revenues, trade, and 
n1ining output. In per capita terms, the era period from 
1630 to 1690 probably \Vitnessed a substantial decline in 
the sectors do1ninated by the enterp1ise of Spaniards and 
creoles (Spaniards born in the colony). The period fro1n 
1690 to 1810, though usually treated as a distinct era of 
gro\vth and prosperity, is no\v vie\ved as a centu1y in \vhich 
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GDP did not gro\V faster than the population. Substantial 
advances in mining output occurred from the 1690s into 
the 1720s, but the rise in silver production over the entire 
centu1y barely exceeded population gro\vth. After 1750, in-
terregional migration accelerated, pa11icularly from the 
depressed Puebla-Tlaxcala area to the grain estates, n1in-
ing centers, and artisan industries of the Bajfo, no1ih and 
\Vest of Mexico City. This movement pushed cattle and 
sheep raising north\vard. Woolen textile production fell, 
ho\veve1~ displaced by cotton substitutes increasingly 
smuggled in from Britain. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Spanish 
government initiated a series of administrative and eco~ 
non1ic policy reforms, especially during the reign of King 
Charles (Carlos) Ill (1759-1788). Collectively known as the 
"Bourbon Reforms,'' the policy changes sought to central-
ize po\ve1~ tighten administration, raise taxes, increase 
trade, and pro1note mining production. The reforn1s had 
n1ixed econon1ic effects. Mining production benefited 
from lo\ver prices charged by the royal n1onopolies that 
supplied nlercu1y and blastiJ:.lg po\vder as \Vell as fron1 tax 
exemptions and the creation of a mining Tribunal (1776) 
and an engineering acaden1y (1792). Trade increased \Vhen 
ships \Vere allo\ved to sail \Vithout \Vaiting for the annual 
fleets (1740), new pmts in Spain and the colonies opened 
to trade (1764-1778), and the monopoly of the Mexico City 
Merchant Guild (Consulado) on all foreign trade transac-
tions ended (1778). Other measures lo\vered some export 
taxes and encouraged trade bet\veen the colonies, but the 
fundamental commercial monopoly that required all for-
eign trade to be car1ied in Spanish ships through Spanish 
ports remained in place. In addition, administrative and 
fiscal reforms increased burdens on other sectors of the 
econon1y by raising excise and sales taxes, collecting the 
tributo more efficiently, imposing ne\v governn1ent 1no-
nopolies on the production and sale of tobacco as \veil as 
other products, and issuing ne\v and cumberson1e regula-
tions to reduce contraband. The net effect of the Bourbon 
Reforms \vas probably small and possibly even negative. 
With GDP per capita stagnant over the eighteenth centu1y, 
Mexico's economy fell frotn rough parity \Vith the thirteen 
British North American colonies to approximately 44 per-
cent of U.S. GDP in 1800. 
Independence to Restored Republic, 1821-1876. A 
legacy of inefficient economic organization co1npounded 
by political instability blocked Mexican economic gro\Vth 
at independence. Many of the colonial regulations and re-
strictions on economic activity disappeared in 1821, in~ 
eluding caste-based li1nits on occupational 1nobility and 
officeholding as \vell as the prohibition on direct trade 
\Vi th countries other than Spain. Ilo\veve1~ 1nany colonial 
institutions and practices continued until the Liberal 
Revolution in the 1850s, \Vhile political risks increased 
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dramatically. Between 1821 and 1867, thirty-three individ-
uals served as Mexico's chief of state, some of \vhom re-
turned to office several times. There \Vere more than fifty 
changes of administration, many of them violent and near-
ly all unconstitutional. During the same years, Mexico ex-
perienced fourteen large-scale indigenous and peasant re-
volts and at least sixty local rural rebellions. 
Instability banktupted successive ad1ninistrations and 
made it iinpossible for Mexico to make regular payments 
on its external public debt after defaulting in 1827. A short-
lived conservative-inspired development bank, the Banco 
de Avio, used custon1s revenues to finance the importation 
of 1nodern textile and other n1achine1)' in the 1830s, but 
the revenues \Vere soon diverted to militaty expenditures, 
and most of the ne\v enterprises failed. Instability also 
made the count1yvulnerable to foreign aggression. Mexico 
experienced three major foreign invasions (Spain in 1829, 
the United States in 1846-1848, and France in 1863-1867). 
Most disastrous for the country \Vas the U.S. invasion that 
forced Mexico to cede half of its national territOt}'. The Cal-
ifornia Gold Rush in the United States began only a fe\v 
months after California ceased to be a part of Mexico. 
The Liberal Revolution, called La refonna, brought Ben-
ito Juarez to po\ver from 1855 to 1872 and resulted in a 
ne\v Constitution of 1857 that separated church and state; 
outlawed the archaic privileges (calledfiieros) of Catholic 
priests and militat}' officers, \Vhich had exempted them 
fron1 the jurisdiction of ordinat}' civil and crin1inal courts; 
abolished the inalienability of property (mortmain) and 
ordered the privatization of the landholdings of indige-
nous villages, municipal governments, and the church; 
and established a federal system of government \Vith strict 
lin1itations on the taxing po\vers of the national govern-
ment. When the church refused to sell its properties and 
suppo1ied Conservative revolts, the Liberal regin1e confis-
cated church lands and urban properties and sold them at 
auction. In 1864, Mexican conservatives allied to the 
church invited Austrian archduke Maximilian of Habs-
burg to beco1ne "emperor'' of Mexico, backed by a French 
of expeditionary force sent by Napoleon !IL In 1867, 
Napoleon \vit11dre\v his forces, and the Liberals under 
Juarez restored the republic. By this time Mexican GDP 
per capita had fallen \vell belO\V late colonial levels. 
The Porflliato, 1876-1911. Mexico's first inodern spu1t 
of sustained econo1nic gro\vth occu1Ted duling the Porfiri-
ato. Population gre\V fron1 9.7 to 15.2 1nillion (1.3 percent 
per annuin). GDP per capita rose 2.5 percent peryea1: The 
end of civil and international strife, along \Vith the reform 
legislation of the Liberal Revolution and succeeding gov-
e111111cnts, cncournged both don1estic and foreign invcst-
111ent. The ne\v legislation included a con1plctc revision of 
the tariff code as \Vell as ne\v co1111nercial and n1ining 
codes in the 1880s. 
High transportation costs, \vhich had inhibited regional 
specialization and kept n1uch of Mexico's land and mineral 
resources isolated from profitable exploitation, \Vere final-
ly overcome \Vi th the building of an extensive railroad net-
\Vork. Though the Mexican governn1ent first granted a 
concession for raihvay construction in 1837, the first ma-
jor Jine, tunning bet\veen Mexico City and Veracruz, \Vas 
not inaugurated until 1873. A period of rapid construction 
began in 1880, \vhen the governn1ent approved conces-
sions for t\vo hunk lines to run from Mexico City to the 
U.S. border. Other lines follo\ved until the rail net\vork 
reached a total of 19,205 kilometers (11,934 miles) on the 
eve of the Revolution in 1910. Recognizing the importance 
of efficient rail service and fearing acquisition of Mexican 
rail companies by unsc1upulous U.S. "financiers," the gov-
ernment decided to "Mexicanize" the major companies. 
Bet\veen 1903 and 1908, the government purchased a con~ 
trolling interest in all the major companies and created a 
ne\v enterprise, the National Raihvays of Mexico (Ferro-
carriles Nacionales de Mexico), to 1un the system. 
Prima1y product expo1is fueled Mexico's economic 
gro\vth during the Porfirian era, though domestic agricul-
ture and manufacturing also gre\v substantially. Exports 
grew 7.6 percent per annum from 1878 to 1910 as the 
export portfolio diversified. Silver exports fell from 76.3 
percent of total exports in 1877-1878 to 28.8 percent in 
1910-1911, as the price of silver fell by more than half. 
Since Mexico nlaintained a silver-based n1onetary system 
until the Monetary Reform of 1905, progressive devalua-
tion 1nay have initially stin1ulated exports. Mean\vhile, ex~ 
port production of industrial n1etals, such as coppe1~ lead, 
and zinc, increased rapidly to supply external, mainly U.S., 
demand. When the U.S. McKinley Tariff of 1890 raised du-
ties on ore imported to the United States but kept rates on 
processed metals lo\v, U.S., European, and Mexican co1n-
panies heavily invested in the creation of a n1odern smelt-
ing industry. Mexico also bccan1e a n1ajor oil producer by 
1910, \Vith the discovery of large deposits in the Tehuante-
pec region and along the Gulf Coast north of the port of 
Verac1uz. 
While mineral ores, metals, and petroleum never 
amounted to less than half of all exports during the Porfiri-
ato, agricultural exports also booincd. The den1and for 
henequen fiber, native to Yucatan_ and produced no\vhere 
else in the \Vorld, skyrocketed \vhen it \Vent into use as 
binder t\vinc in McCorn1ick reapers on farms throughout 
the United States. Mexico also exported chickpeas from 
Sonora, coffee from Tabasco and Chiapas, vanilla from Ve-
racruz state, and cattle and hides fro1n the norlhern states 
along the U.S. border in this era. 
Den1ographic and econo1nic gro\vth stimulated both do· 
1nestic and foreign direct investtnent in industry. Do1nestic 






processing) n1odernized \Vith a national n1arket nO\V ac-
cessible by rail. The production of cotton and other indus-
trial crops gre\v rapidly, \vhile domestic food production 
kept pace \Vith population. 
Despite the material progress bet\veen 1867 and 1910, 
Mexican social conditions did not improve and may even 
have \Vorsened significantly for n1any. Life expectancy at 
birth in the late Porfiriato \Vas estimated at 29.5 years, the 
infant mortality rate stood more than 280 per 1,000 live 
births, and illiteracy re1nained high at 78 percent. Inequal-
ity in the distribution of income as \vell as assets probably 
increased. Modernization and econo1nic gro\vth provoked 
\videspread concentration of lando\vnership. Church and 
public lands passed to \Vealthy bidders \vhile indigenous 
villagers \Vere forced to privatize communal plots, making 
the1n vulnerable to usurpation. Railroads connected once-
isolated crop and cattle lands to distant markets and 1nade 
them \Vorth taking. Landless villagers poured into the mar-
ket for unskilled labo1~ just as economic gro\vth increased 
demand and salaries for skilled and educated employees. 
With tax revenues to the central government iunning at 
less than 5 percent of GDP, the Dfaz government had fe\v 
resources to devote to social questions. 
Revolution and Institutionalization, 1911-1982. The 
Mexican Revolution marked a \vatershed in Mexico's eco-
non1ic history. As many as one 1nillion inhabitants 1nay 
have died in civil \Varfare bet\veen 1911and1916, \Vhile 
another half million or more fled the count1y. Contending 
ar1nies wreaked havoc on the railroads, seizing locon10-
tives and rolling stock for troop transportation \vhile blo\v-
ing up track and bridges to deny their use to ene1nies. Inse-
curity in the countiyside increased as peasant militias and 
1nilita1y con1manders seized haciendas. Successive gov-
ern1nents sought to enlist urban \Vorkers' support by 
backing strikes and enforcing \Vage agreen1ents. Global 
· · demand for Mexican exports, especially oil and metals, 
skyrocketed during World War I but collapsed in the 1919 
recession. The economy began to recover in the 1920s, but 
gro\vth declined again due in part to rene\ved civil strife, 
including a \videspread peasant revolt called the Cristero 
War (1926-1929) linked to church-state conflicts. Mexico 
had just surpassed prerevolutiona1y levels of per capita 
GDP \Vhen the Great Depression struck. 
Pressures for political, social, and economic change, en-
couraged during the presidential ad1ninistration of Lfizaro 
Cardenas (1934-1940), led to 1nassive agrarian reforn1 and 
government support for union organizing. Bet\veen 1935 
and 1940, the Cardenas governn1ent expropriated and re-
distributed eighteen inillion hectares of land, a1nounting 
to a third of the counhy's arable farmland. In 1938, \vhen 
foreign-o\vncd petroleu1n companies refused to obey an 
order of the Mexican Supren1c Court upholding an official 
arbitration decision that favored oil \Vorkers and their 
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union, the Cardenas government expropriated the con1pa-
nies and created Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), a state-
O\Vned company, to take over production and distribution. 
A retaliato1y embargo by the United States and Great 
Britain ended quickly as World War II broke out and Mexi-
co's oil and mineral resources becan1e vital to the Allied 
\Var effort. 
The depression reduced Mexico's capacity to in1port, 
\vhile government policies tended to cushion the fall in 
consu1ner demand among lo,ver- and n1iddle-income peoH 
ple. Mexican industry experienced a quick recovery f:ron1 
the depression and substantial gro\vth in n1anufacturing 
output, but since the country lacked the capacity to in1port 
capital goods, this gro\vth \Vas achieved by n1aking 1nore 
intensive use of existing plants and equipment. During 
World War II, this trend continued and intensified, as the 
economy responded to huge increases in demand for \Var-
related metals and other products. Bottlenecks gre\v 
in transportation, sn1elting, and other industries. Output 
rose but productivity declined. Wa1iime inflation reversed 
the \Vage gains achieved in the 1930s but favored so1ne 
farmers, including those ne\vly endo,ved \Vith land titles. 
In 1942, the United States and Mexico cooperated to create 
a large-scale guestH\vorker progran1 that permitted son1e 
three hundred thousand Mexican \Vorkers to perform agri-
cultural labor and eventually other jobs in the United 
States to make up for \Va1time labor shortages. This 
bracero (laborer) program lasted until the U.S. govern-
ment closed it do\vn in 1964, by\vhich time 1nore than four 
1ni11ion Mexicans had participated. 
After 1940, the governn1cnt's strategy shifted from re-
for1n and redistribution to investment and productivity 
gro\vth. The governing party \Vas renamed the Partido de 
la Revoluci6n Institucional (PRI) in 1946 to emphasize 
this change of direction. The political ca'jJital accumulated 
in the Cardenas era and the high rates of economic gro\vth 
actually achieved during the post\var decades legitin1ated 
the regime and contributed to stability. Labor peace \Vas 
assured by collaboration bet\veen the governn1ent and the 
leaders of the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico 
(CTM), the largest union federation officially incorpo'rated 
into the PRI beginning in 1938. An explicit strategy of im-
port-substitution industrialization (ISI) adopted during 
the adn1inistration of President Miguel Aleman Valdes 
from 1946 to 1952 required an environment that protected 
don1estic manufacturers and \velcon1ed (but for political 
reasons also strictly regulated) foreign direct investment. 
Government development banks like Nacional Financiera 
(NAFINSA) provided loans and other assistance to many 
domestically O\vned industries. After a sharp devaluation 
in 1954, Mexican authorities pegged the peso to the U.S. 
dollar and \Vorked successfu1ly to keep inflation lo\v; this 
policy of "stabilizing development" continued until U.S. 
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macroeconomic policy itself became unstable in the early 
1970s. 
Over the four decades from 1940 to 1980, Mexican per 
capita GDP gre\v at an annual average rate of 3.2 percent. 
This post-World War II "miracle" coincided with high 
rates of population gro\vth due mainly to falling mortality 
rates. Manufacturing an.cl services gre\v faster than the 
econo1ny as a \vhole. Agricultural production kept pace 
with population growth until the 1970s. The !SI strategy 
also succeeded in reducing the countt}''s "dependence" on 
exports and foreign investment. Fron1 1940 to 1976, ex-
ports fell from 11.6 to 3.8 percent of GDP. Mexico's share of 
world trade also fell dramatically. 
Internal pressures con1bined \Vith external shocks to un-
dermine Mexico's !SI strategy in the 1970s. The U.S. deci-
sion to float the dollar in 1971, the 1973-1974 oil price 
shock, and U.S. "stagflation" created dilemn1as for Mexi-
can policyn1akers. Political \von·ies follo\ving the repres-
sion of a nalion\vi<le pru<le1nocracy student moven1ent in 
1968 pushed Mexican authorities to deepen the country's 
commitment to protectionism, public o\vnership, and cen-
tralized regulation of econon1ic activity. Balance of pay-
ments and fiscal constraints 1nade these policies unsus-
tainable. President Luis Echevarrfa Alvarez (1970-1976) 
\Vas forced to devalue the peso and sharply reduce spend-
ing in the last year of his ad111inistration. 
'fhe discovery of vast ne\v oil reserves in the states of 
I'abasco and Chiapas and in the Gulf of Mexico, an-
nounced in 1976, restored the government's shaky credit 
and allo\ved the ne\v administration of Jose L6pez Po1iillo 
(1976-1982) to bmrnw heavily from international com-
n1ercial banks, both to finance petroleum developn1ent 
and to cover fiscal deficits. In 1976, Mexico \Vas a net 
importer of petroleun1 products. By 1980, oil exports 
amounted to more than U.S. $6 billion, more than 70 per-
cent of total exports. A\vash in petrodollars and commer-
cial loans to governn1ent and the private sector, Mexico ex-
perienced a brief episode of Dutch disease. With the peso 
overvalued by as much as 30 percent, nonoil export pro-
ducers lost markets and declined sharply. 
A severe financial and economic crisis hit Mexico \Vhen 
the oil boom ended during 1981 and 1982. The crisis origi-
nated not in Mexico but in the United States, \Vhere U.S. 
authorities began driving up interest rates to control infla~ 
tion. This caused a rapid increase in Mexico's debt burden 
and then, as a deep recession hit the United States, a rapid 
fall in oil p1ices, With debt payments spiraling up,vard and 
oil revenues do\vn sharply, Mexico \Vas forced in Septem-
ber 1982 to announce that it could nOt meet pay1nents on 
its external debt, much of it no\v in short~term insttuments 
that were payable in full in less than 180 days. The peso col-
lapsed, the government nationalized the banking systen1, 
and though Mexico eventually 1net its debt payments \Vith 
loans fTotn international agencies and the United States, 
the econon1y sank into a deep and prolonged recession 
provoked by sharp cuts in spending and increased taxes. 
The Free n·ade Era, from 1982 into the Twenty-first 




\Vithout abandoning ISI and the prevailing state-directed 
econo1nic strategy, the ne\v administration of President 
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) abrnptly aban-
doned it in favor of a ne\v strategy based on freer trade, 
deregulation, and privatization. In 1985 to 1986, Mexico 
joined the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), dropped tmiff rates on a wide range of imports, 
and began dismantling a long list of nontariff regulatory 
barriers to foreign in1ports. These policies \Vere carried 
further under succeeding presidents, Carlos Salinas de 
Go1iari (1988 to 1994), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n 
(1994-2000), and Vicente Fox Quesada (2000- ). The eco-
nomic policy changes enacted by the Salinas administra-
tion \Vere especially dramatic and decisive. The govern-
ment lo\Vered tariffs even further and eliminated most 
other non tariff barriers, did a\vay \Vith a \vide range of reg-
ulations and restrictions on foreign direct investment, 
renegotiated the external debt on more favorable te1ms, 
privatized several hundred state-o\vned companies, and in 
1993 signed the No1ih American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) with the United States and Canada. 
The effects of Mexico's ne\V economic strategy varied 
across sectors of the economy. Inefficient producers de-
prived of tariff and other protections quickly succumbed 
to foreign competition, though grain fa1mers and co1n-
mercial banks got a ten1porary reprieve \Vhen NAFTA ne-
gotiators agreed to delay the full effects of external compe-
tition for especially \veak sectors of the Mexican economy 
for up to fifteen years. Small and 1nedium manufacturers 
of consumer products \Vere especially hard hit. Ne\v for-
eign direct investment concentrated in sectors privatized 
by the government, such as telecommunications, airlines, 
steel, and truck manufacturing, and in sectors producing 
for the U.S. nlarket, such as auton1ohiles and auto parts. 
Assembly plants using in1po1ted components to produce 
export products (called 111aquiladoras) expanded rapidly 
after NAFTA and spread out from the northern states to 
other regions of the counhy. Mexican exports rose from 
8.2 percent of GDP in 1980 to 28.1 percent in 1999. By this 
time, petroleum exports had declined to 7 .2 percent of to-
tal exports. GDP gro\vth, ho\veve1~ re1nained disappoint-
ing. In 1999, Mexican GDP per capita was only 10.7 per-
cent above the level it had reached in 1980. 
At the end of the t\ventieth centuty, Mexico's econo1ny 
had resumed gro\ving steadily, though still at rates belo\V 
those of the 1950s and 1960s. Economic integration \Vith 
the United States reached unprecedented levels as the full 
impact of NAFTA took hold. Slower population growth-
do\vn to 1.6 percent per year at the end of the hventieth cen-
tury---"·pro1nised lo\ver dependency, lo\ver unemploy1nent 
rates, and higher savings. The cu1nulative effects of \velfarc 
i1nprove1nents during the t\ventieth century \Vere also evi-
dent. Life expectancy rose to 1nore than seventy years, the 
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infant 1nortality rate had dropped to about thhty per one 
thousand live bitths, and the illiteracy rate \Vas do\Vn to 10 
percent. Nonetheless, Mexico continued to lag in effOrts to 
address pove1ty, lo\V educational attainment, and a \Vide 
range of chronic public health problen1s, including rural 
malnutrition as \vell as urban air and \Vater pollution. 
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JOHN H. CoATS\VORTH 
MEXICO CITY. The greater Mexico City Metropolitan 
Area (MCMA), covering 4,918 square ki101neters, contained 
a total population of 16.8 n1i1lion people in 1995, second in 
the \Vorld only to Tokyo. Of that nu111be1~ 8.6 1nillion lived in 
